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WEALTH EFFECTS OF THE DRUG PRICE COMPETITION
AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984
by Raymond Brastow and David Rystrom*
1. Introduction
In September
of 1984, President Reagan
signed into law a compromise bill that sped up
the government
certification
and
simplified
process for generic drugs that are substitutes for
patented brand-name drugs and in return granted
brand-name manufacturers
longer patent protec

than 25 years. In December
of
gress formore
on
the
Subcommittee
Antitrust
and
1959,
of the Senate Judiciary Committee
Monopoly
on the relationship between
began hearings

patents, high drug prices, and large profits in the
drug industry. The hearings continued through

1960 and by 1961 a seriesof amendmentsto the
1938

tion. This

and Cosmetic
Act were
Food,
Drug
were
to
which
foster
compe
proposed
designed

changes in patent protection laws that began in
1959. The final version of the law contained
provisions thatwere both favorable and unfavor
able to drug producers; therefore, the expected
net impact upon drug producing firms was not
the
immediately clear. This paper examines
this
of
in
change
government regulation
impact
by examining stock prices of drug firms around

was widely supported, debate over its
provisions
it from making
until
kept
rapid progress

and
law, the Drug Price Competition
was
the
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
end result of a series of debates and proposed

the timeof the legislativediscussion of thebill

in the summer of 1984. Using
daily stock
returns, we find a significant increase in stock

prices of firms primarily engaged in the

find no
generic drugs. We
on
of
firms engaged in
significant impact
prices
themanufacture of already existing, brand name
drugs. Thus, the Act appears to have produced
net benefits to the drug industry.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2
the historical
to the
provides
background
and
the
of
events
sequence
legislation
leading to
the passage of the law. Section 3 discusses
the
economic
of
the
law
and
describes
significance
the hypothesis to be tested. Section 4 describes
the data and the methodology
of the study.
Section 5 presents the results and their interpre
tation, and Section 6 summarizes the findings.
of

manufacture

2. Congressional Action on Drug Prices,
Patents, and Competition
Debate

over

pharmaceutical
* Assistant
University.

the effect of patents
industry has continued

on the
in Con

Professor Economics, Longwood College,

titionamong drug companies.Although thebill

in committee.
changes were made
Ironically, the version which eventually reached
the floor and was passed
in 1962 had been

significant

strippedof theprovisionswhich dealt with the

original concerns: drug prices and profits.1 The
law was chiefly concerned with the safety and
effectiveness of new drugs and resulted in the

FDA

approval process becoming more lengthy;
drugs had to be proved effective as well as safe.
The law did, however, require that the generic
name of a drug be on its label, thus
providing
the impetus for eventual generic competition.
the succeeding
two decades,
Throughout
debate
took
the
continuing
place concerning
effects of patents on the drug industry. In
to the allegation
addition
that patents create
"excessive"
a
created

profits,
different

the 1962
concern:

legislation had
the new drug
had become so lengthy

approval (NDA) process
that it took much of the 17-year patent period to
bring a drug to market. To correct this, the
Patent Extension Act of 1981 was passed by the
Senate on July 9; this bill would have granted
extensions of patents for up to seven years to

drugs thathad been the subject of a lengthy

the bill failed to
approval process. However,
in
the
House
of
in a very
pass
Representatives
close
vote.
roll-call
It was
sent back
to
committee and died at the end of 1982, at least
and Assistant Professor of Finance, Western Washington
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partlybecause of intenselobbyingby thegeneric
drug industry.
Patent hearings began in 1983 in both houses.
In 1984, the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration was introduced into both the
Senate and the House. The compromise bill was
the patent extension
intended to counterbalance

aspects of the 1982 bill by adding benefits to

generic interests. It had three major provisions:
1. Extension
of an abbreviated
approval
to
process
generic versions of drugs approved

after 1962. Existing law provided for this

abbreviated approval only for generic versions
of drugs for which the original patented version
to
was approved before 1962. A firm wishing
a
a
drug approved
generic version of
produce

after 1962 had to go throughthe same lengthy

process as the original patent-holder. This
provision was themost important one of the bill;
itwould clearly reduce time and costs to bring
generic substitutes to market.
to the FDA to postpone approval
2. Direction
a
the subject of
of
generic drug that was

NDA

litigation over patent infringement brought by
the patent holder. The postponement would be
in force until the case was decided, but could
last no longer than eighteen months.
3. Single extension of a first patent for drugs

subject to FDA approval. The extension would
last two years for drugs awaiting approval at the
time of the bill's enactment and up to five years
for drugs submitted for approval after enact
ment. However,
the total length of patent
not
exceed fourteen years from
could
protection
the date of FDA approval. This had the effect of

lengthening the patent protection
moderately
some
brand-name drugs.
for
period
This version of the bill was perceived as being
even
to generic
favorable
drug producers,
as a carefully
been
constructed
it
had
though
built, compromise which had the support of all
trade groups and the leadership of both parties.
eleven major brand-name manufactur
However,
ers split with their trade group and lobbied
the bill was sent to the
against the bill. When
Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee,
it was
by those brand-name
strongly opposed
was
altered
and consequently
manufacturers
again in committee to grant additional protection
firms. The amended bill was
to brand-name
on August
reported favorably by the committee
new
three
8, containing
provisions.

1. The

maximum
of generic
postponement
drug approval during patent infringement litiga
tion was extended from 18-30 months.
2. For new drugs without active patents, no
for two,
generic version could be approved
or
five
after
the
three,
years
approval of the
on
nature
the
of the drug.
original, depending
3. The patent-holder could decide the patent
for which to request an extension. The original

version of the bill had specified that thefirst
patent would
extension.2

be

the only one

eligible

for an

The Senate passed thebill on August 10. The

an almost
identical version on
passed
the
Senate
September 6,
agreed to the House
version on September
12, and the President
on
it
law
into
September 24. Passage of
signed
the bill was the culmination of a 25 year debate
on drug prices and patents.
house

3. Economic Implications and
Hypotheses
and Patent Term
The Drug Price Competition
Restoration Act of 1984 was a compromise bill
of
which conferred benefits to manufacturers
both brand-name and generic drugs. The major
provision of an abbreviated approval process for
generic drugs was clearly of benefit to generic

drug producers; generic drugs could be brought
to market considerably sooner and at lower cost
this
law. However,
than under the previous
benefit may have been partially or completely
offset by provisions protecting brand-name firms
that extended patent lengths and granted in
creased protection to new unpatented drugs, thus
introduction of generic
the potential
delaying
in
future.
the
competitors
Since in an efficient stock market stock prices
of the future
reflect the market's
expectation
profitability of a firm, the market's assessment
of the expected
impact of a new law can be
examined by observing changes in stock prices
associated with times of legislative action on the
bill. By analyzing daily stock prices we examine
the hypothesis that investors viewed the legisla
tion to be on balance a net benefit to the generic
a test for the
industry. Formally, we perform
that there was no impact on
null hypothesis
share prices from the legislation. Similarly, we
also examine the expected effect of the bill on
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brand-name producers by examining the behav
ior of the stock prices of those firms.
involved in congres
the bill was
Although
for several months
sional deliberations
(see
Table
1), we chose August 8 as the pivotal date
for our analysis of stock prices. At that time the
reported to the Senate the
Judiciary Committee
final

compromise
of the
objections
who
manufacturers
earlier versions of
effects: it overcame

that satisfied the
version
brand-name
eleven major
had refused to endorse
the bill. This event had two
to the
the final opposition
more
appear
probable, and

bill, making passage
it granted additional protection to brand-name
interests. Therefore, the net impact of the event
on generic firms' stock prices could have been
If the bill's passage was
positive or negative.
8, then
prior to August
anticipated
widely
have
fallen
due to
would
stock
prices
generic

revision of the previously anticipated
the bill. Generic
stock prices would
if the compromise provisions resulted
formed anticipations of passage of a
was
on balance
to the
favorable
a
in
decrease
prices
generic industry. Similarly,
indicate an
of brand-name firms' stocks would
of a bill
of passage
increased
probability
unfavorable to these firms, while an increase in

Zenith Labs.

Bolar Pharmaceutical

was

traded on

theAmerican Stock Exchange (ASE) while the

four others were traded in the Over-the-Counter
(OTC) market. Daily stock prices were obtained
from Standard and Poor's Daily
Stock Price
Record. The closing price was used forBolar Phar

maceutical

while

the asked price was

used as the

daily price for theOTC stocks.3

We also examine the stock prices of six major
firms engaged in themanufacture of brand-name
in the news as
drugs that were often mentioned

being vulnerable to imminent competition from
generic substitutes. These firms were American
Home Products, Merck, Pfizer, Searle, Smith
kline Beckman,
and Upjohn.
This
list is not
exhaustive of all producers of vulnerable brand
name drugs; we
our sample
to
constrained
publicly traded firms for which production of
brand name drugs was an important source of
revenue and profits.4 All of these firms' stocks

downward
impact of
have risen
in newly
bill which

were traded on the New York Stock Exchange;
we used daily closing prices in the analysis.
For each group of firms, a time series of daily
common stock returns was constructed for two

their stock prices would
benefits of the additional

through May 25, 1984. This period is used as a
for analysis
because
it
comparison
period
the
time
of
deliberation
precedes
congressional
and action. The second period consists of the

4. Data

reflect the anticipated
provisions.

and Methodology

first examine the stock prices of the five
publicly traded firms primarily engaged in theman
ufacture of generic drugs: Bolar Pharmaceutical,
and
Lyphomed, Mylan Labs, Par Pharmaceutical,
We

TABLE 1
Selected Events Associated with theDrug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984
June 12
July 28
August 8
August 10
September 6
September 24

House
and Commerce
Energy
Committee reports bill
re
House
Judiciary Committee
ports bill
Senate Judiciary Committee re
ports revised bill
Senate passes bill on voice vote
House passes bill 362-0
President signs bill

periods during 1984. The firstperiod consistsof
the 100 tradingdays from January5, 1984

101 tradingdays fromMay 29, 1984 through
October 18, 1984.This period includesthedates

of all congressional discussion and action on the
bill and is centered on August 8, 1984, the date
of final Senate Committee action on the bill (see
returns for each day are
Table
1). Average
as
calculated
the arithmetic mean
of the
individual returns of the companies
in each
group. This return can be interpreted as the
return to an equally-weighted
portfolio of the
stocks in each group. The use of portfolio
returns averaged across securities mitigates the
influence of firm-specific effects.
possible
We
then calculate market adjusted returns for
each portfolio by subtracting the daily return on
the Standard and Poor's 500 Composite Index from
each daily portfolio return to get a measure of
return corrected formarket movements. This pro
duces a series of returns for each group of firms;
we then observe themarket
adjusted return on and
surrounding the dates of legislative events.

Brown and Warner

(1980,

1985), Dann
61
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that the
(1980), and others have demonstrated
mean
tests using
"raw"
returns,
adjusted
returns, market adjusted returns, or risk adjusted
returns produce results that are quite similar,
when
daily returns are analyzed.
especially
returns
risk has little or no impact
for
Adjusting

on results or power of tests when daily returns
are used. We
report our results in terms of
market adjusted returns in order to demonstrate
the magnitude of the "abnormal" portion of the
impact, but the significance of our results was
unchanged when we examined raw returns and
mean adjusted returns.5

5. Empirical Results
2 presents cumulative market adjusted
returns around
the date of final
portfolio
on the bill for
action
committee
congressional
1
brand-name
and
firms.
Column
firms
generic
identifies the trading date relative to day 0,
which
is August
8, the day that the Senate
committee reported the final version of the bill.
Columns 2 and 3 present the cumulative market
Table

TABLE 2

Brand Name
Firms

Generic Firms

-0.21

-50 -0.03

1.81
4.96
-2.32

-403.75
-304.73
8.46
-20
-106.10

increase occurring near August 8. Brand name
firms' stock experienced
slight negative market
adjusted returns over the same time period.
Table 3 examines the dates of August 8, 9, 10

(Friday),and 13more closely by presentingthe

daily market adjusted returns for each portfolio of
firms. August 8 is the date that the altered version
of the bill was reported by the Senate committee
while August 10 is the date that the Senate passed

thebill. Since theexact timeduringtheday that

the information became available to themarket is
the information may have been im
unclear,
stock prices on the event day and/or
into
pounded

the subsequentday.We find thattheAugust 9

market adjusted return is 3.70% and the August
10 market adjusted return is 3.07%
for generic
are
which
both
of
firms,
statistically significant at

the 5% confidence level.6 This is strong evidence
supporting the hypothesis that the bill, even after
alterations favoring brand-name
interests, pro
vided net benefits to generic firms; the joint events

of the committee's reporting of the bill and the
Senate's passage of the bill caused an unantici

Cumulative Market Adjusted Portfolio Rates of
Return for 101 Trading Days Surrounding
August 8, 1984
Trading Day

adjusted daily returns for the equal weighted
portfolio for each group of firms. It is apparent
from the table that generic firms' stock prices
rose markedly over this period, with much of the

- 12.80
5
- 11.53
4
- 11.26
3
- 11.66
2
115.29
015.57
+ 119.27
+ 2
22.35
+ 320.92
+ 421.40
+ 522.72
+ 10
27.79
+ 20
26.15
+ 3017.18
+ 4018.47
+
50_15?1_-2.38

-3.39

-3.68
-3.79
-4.83
-6.22
-5.17
-5.75
-6.64
-5.25
-5.20
-5.65
-5.52
-6.49
-5.73
-6.67
-3.16

pated increase in the aggregate wealth of share
holders of generic drug companies of over 6%.
Based on the prices and number of shares out
standing for these firms as of August 8, this ab
normal return translates into an increase inwealth
by shareholers of approximately fortymillion dol
lars.

The evidence about brand-name firms is less
There
is positive market adjusted
conclusive.
return, statistically significant at the 5% level,
no
for August
10, the date of Senate passage;
inter
other significant returns are evident. We
to indicate that the market
pret this evidence
of the bill as providing net
viewed passage
benefits to brand-name firms, relative to prior
expectations. That is, while the bill may indeed
have had a net negative impact on brand-name
firms (which is suggested by the cumulative
returns shown in Table 2), the final passage of
the altered version of the bill was a pleasant
on brand
surprise producing a positive impact
name stock prices. However,
it is surprising that
there is no observable
impact for brand-name
firms on August 8 or August 9. In addition, we
note that the cumulative
four-day return for
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TABLE 3
Daily Market Adjusted Returns forGeneric and Brand-Name Drug Companies
August 8-August 13, 1984
Brand

Generics
t-statistics
Rp(%)

Aug
. .
t statistic

=-1/0

Rp?

-0.90
-1.40

-0.58
-0.89

2.23*

3.07

Aug 10

t-statistic

Rp(%)

0.03
2.73*

0.28Aug
8
3.70Aug
9

Names

1.40

2.28*

13_-1.42_-1.32_OJ05_0.11

Re

s(l + l/n)1/2
=
the daily portfolio returnon day 0
where: Rp
= themean
Re
portfolio returnduring the control period, 0.26% for generics and 0.08% for brand-names
s= the sample standard deviation of the time series of the portfolio returns during the control period,
1.26% for generics and 0.62% for brand-names
n = the number of observations in the control period, n= 100
*
Significant at the 5% level.

in
brand-name firms for the dates examined
an
zero. Therefore,
3 is approximately
Table
appropriate conclusion may be that the passage
of the Act had no net impact on brand-name
firms.

Our hypothesis is that there was a significant
stock prices at
impact upon drug manufacturers'
the time that the market judged passage of the
bill to be likely. We have focused our study on
the dates of August 8 and August 10, but there is
some difficulty in determining
the
obviously
to
event
be
examined
dates
for
any
appropriate

of this kind; themarket is constantly reassessing
the probability of a bill's passage throughout the
legislative process, so the total impact of the law
on stock prices may be spread over several days
of legislative events. (Schwert (1981) reviews
the application
and difficulties of using stock
market data to assess the impact of legislative
actions.)
Since there are several dates in 1984 on which
there was legislative action on the event (Table
1), we also examine the returns associated with
those dates. Table 4 presents themarket adjusted
returns for 3 trading days surrounding each
event date described in Table
1.We
include the
to
event
the
the
event,
date,
trading day prior
and the day after the event in our analysis

because of the uncertainty about the exact time
of the market's first receipt of the information.
We also calculate the mean 3-day return and a t
statistic to test the hypothesis
that the mean

adjusted return over the 3-day period is
significantly different from the mean market
adjusted return for the comparison period.7
For generic firms, we observe that only the
10
3-day mean returns for August 8 and August
are statistically significant, although the positive

market

returns observed around the June 12 and July 30
events are weakly
im
suggestive of possible
Since
the
8
and
10
pacts.
August
August
are
we
cannot
three-day periods
overlapping,
that both events jointly
reject the hypothesis
the
returns associated with
abnormal
produced
the two dates. The evidence
is consistent with
the hypothesis that passage of the bill increased
thewealth of shareholders of generic drug firms.
For brand-name firms, no mean returns are
significant for any of the legislative events. This
result indicates that the Act had no significant
effect on the value of the brand-name firms.
This
result is not surprising as all of these
are large and diversified;
thus the
companies
impact on any single product could be small
relative to the rest of a firm's product lines. Any
economic effect from theAct could easily be too
small to be observed in the firm's stock prices.

6. Conclusion
Our

results demonstrate

that the compromise

drug legislationof 1984 increasedthewealth of
shareholders
in generic
drug manufacturing
the market evaluated
the compromises

firms;
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TABLE 4
Market Adjusted Returns for 3 Day Periods Around Dates of Legislative Events (%)
A. Generic Firms
Trading Day Relative To Event
2.55
12
June
1.31
July30#
3.63 Aug
8
3.70 Aug
10
0.52 Sept
6
-0.62Sept
24

~

D
+1 Date
0
-1

Mean Return

-1.01
0.48
1.26
2.92
3.70
2.54
-1.42
1.78
-0.30 -0.52
0.05
-0.79

-0.11
-0.44
0.28
3.07
-1.77
1.56

t-statistics

0.29
1.35
3.05*
1.98*
-1.03
-0.40

B. Brand-Name Firms

June12
July30#
Aug 8
Aug 10
Sept 6

0.73
-0.36
1.05
-0.89
-0.06

-0.12
0.00
-0.58
1.40
0.55

0.33
0.32
-0.14
0.19
0.15

0.39
1.31
-0.89
0.05
-0.04

0.69
0.65
-0.61
0.30
0.19

Sept
24_-0.62_0/22_(^54_O05_-0.08

r/nasa2 +

_Rp3~~Rc

ncsc2\/l + m1/2

[\na + nc-2/\na nJJ

where: Rp3 = mean portfolio market adjusted returnover 3 days
= themean
Re
portfolio market adjusted returnduring the control period
= the
announce
sa
sample standard deviation of the portfolio market adjusted returns over the 3 day
ment period
=
sc the sample standard deviation of the portfolio market adjusted returns during the control period
=
=
na the number of observations in the announcement period, na 3
= the number of observations in the control
nc
period, nc= 100
*
at
5%
level
the
significant
# July 28, the date the bill was reported out of theHouse JudiciaryCommittee was a Saturday. We use July
30, the first trading day following the event, as day 0.

incorporated in the bill as producing expected
net benefits to the generic industry.8 In addition,
we conclude that themajor part of the impact of
into share prices in the
the bill was capitalized
in
four days surrounding the date of its passage
and the full
the Senate
Judiciary Committee
Senate, more than threemonths before itbecame
law.

results of the analysis of brand-name drug
are not as conclusive but suggest
no significant impact on the stock
the
firms. Apparently
of brand-name
values
the
and
bill
final
features of the
compromise
were
bill
the
about
resolution of uncertainty
viewed as being favorable to brand names to
such an extent as to offset the expected costs
The

manufacturers
that there was

from future competition
turing firms.

from generic manufac

Notes
1. For a detailed history of the 1962 legislation, see
Harris (1964).
2. Patent-holders typically have several patents over
a drug and the critical patent which maintains
exclusive marketing power is often not the first.
3. We examined the data to determine if use of bid
our
prices or themean of bid-asked prices altered
results and found no significant differences.
4.

Even

though

name

drug

still

relatively

we

restricted

producers,
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large

our

the firms
ones

sample
in our

that

of

brand

sample

produce

arc

many

products other than patent protected drugs. Itwas
not possible to determine what proportion of each
firm's sales were of prescription drugs vulnerable
to generic competition. The firms did include in
their 1984 annual reports the proportion of their
sales from their divisions that included pharma
ceuticals. The mean percentage of sales of each
firm thatwas accounted for by its division that
included prescription drugs was 50%. The range
was from Merck's
34% of sales from their
"Human and Animal Health Products" division to
"Human Health Care" divi
66% for Upjohn's
sion. Obviously,
prescription pharmaceuticals
would constitute only a proportion of sales for
each division. However, each company clearly
considered prescription drugs to be its "lead
the 1984 annual report of each
products";
company began with a description and discussion
of the firm's major prescription drugs. In some
annual reports, the 1984 Act was noted as a
potential negative factor for the firm's future
sales. We also found some additional evidence
thatpotential loss of sales to a generic competitor
is a significant, wealth-reducing event to a large
brand-name producer. On July 10, 1984, theFood
and Drug Administration approved a generic
substitute (produced by a nonpublicly traded firm)
for a Merck product, Aldemet, a popular drug for
the treatment of high blood pressure. Merck's
stock fell 45/8point on the day of the announce
ment, a negative returnof 5.1% for one day. This
event, which was not directly related to legislative
activity about the 1984 Act, provides some
preliminary evidence that an event that increases
the probability of generic competition is poten
tially significant, even to a large diversified firm.
5. We also estimated a Beta coefficient for each
portfolio using daily returns from the comparison
period. The estimated Beta was .63 for generic
firms and
.88 for brand-name firms (each
statistically significant at the 1% level), indicating
that these firms had relatively low levels of
systematic risk.We did not risk adjust our returns
because

of

the well-known

measurement

prob

lems with Betas and the unlikelihood of risk
adjusted returns affecting any results when daily

data

6. The

is analyzed.

t-statistic is distributed Student-t under the
assumption that portfolio daily returns are inde
pendent, identically distributed, and normal.
Where the sample size is large, as here, the test
statistic is approximately normal. See Dann
(1981), Fama (1976), and Brown and Warner
(1985) for a discussion of this test and evidence
about distributions of daily returns.
7. For a discussion of this test, see Dann (1981).

Leftwich (1981) performs a test for multi-day
announcement period returnsbased on cumulative
returns over the announcement period. The test
are approximately equivalent.
8. Whether the bill benefited consumers is unre
solved by our analysis. The expectation that the
generic industrywould become more profitable
does not necessarily imply that consumers would
be expected to gain. Consumer interest groups
lobbied for the bill in Congress, presumably
because
they expected greater availability of
to result in savings for
substitutes
generic
consumers. However, welfare implications for
consumers hinge on the acceptance by consumers
of generic versions of brand-name drugs and on
the price response by brand-name producers. If
consumers

are

reluctant

to

purchase

generic

drugs, perhaps due to the cost of acquiring
information about their quality, and brand-name
firms increase their prices in response to generic
competition then consumers in the aggregate may
suffer a welfare loss. See Leffler (1981) for a
discussion of the issues involved in new product
entry to drug markets.
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